This paper investigates the relationship between money growth, inflation, and productive activity in a general equilibrium model where search frictions motivate the transactions role of money.
I. Introduction
The relationship between money growth, inflation, and real activity is a classic and much debated issue in monetary economics. Contrary to the Phillips curve view of decades past, general equilibrium models of money tend to favor the conclusion that steady inflation is disruptive to economic activity. For example, money growth in cash-in-advance models with production [Stockman (1981) and Cooley and Hansen (1989) ] generates a pure inflation tax effect which discourages market activities requiring cash. As a result, consumption, work effort, output, and the capital stock all decline with the inflation rate. Shopping time and money-in-the utility function models [e.g., McCallum and Goodfriend (1988) ] also have a similar prediction. However, these approaches and their predictions have raised some concerns.
First, they approximate trade frictions which give rise to a transactions role formoney in an otherwise Wairasian setting. Such a theoretical short-cut leads these approaches to overlook the impact of money growth and inflation on the very frictions which give rise to money as a medium of exchange. Secondly, evidence of a consistently negative relationship between inflation and economic activity is far from conclusive. While some cross-country studies and evidence from hyperinflation episodes [e.g., Fischer(1983) , Cooley and Hansen (1989) , and Aiyagari and Eckstein (1994) ] find a negative correlation between inflation and output growth, these findings may be influenced by the observation that countries with sustained high inflation also experience highly variable inflation.' A recent study by Bullard and Keating (1995) finds that a negative moneyoutput growth correlation is absent from stable price industrialized countries.
'As argued by Jones and Manuelli (1995) , it may be this variability of high inflation, rather than the level itself, which generates distortions and disrupts economic activity. 1 This paper evaluates the consequences of money growth and inflation on economic activity in the context of a search/matching model of money that highlights the decentralized and costly nature ofthe exchange process. Search theoretic approaches to monetary theory emphasize that the use of a medium of exchange minimizes the time or resource costs associated with searching for exchange opportunities, hence alleviating the "double coincidence of wants" problem with barter.
The seminal work of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989 ,1991 formalizes this aspect of monetary exchange in the search equilibrium paradigm of Diamond (1982 Diamond ( ,1984 .
The particular search framework we adopt is based upon a "multiple" matching model of money developed by Laing, Li, Wang (1997) . Such an approach, while embodying the "double coincidence of wants" frictions, utilizes an environment which allows us to relax restrictions on the divisibility and storability of goods and money often imposed in search-theoretic models of money. 2
The key features which allows us to accomplish this in a tractable manner are (i) abandoning a sequential search structure and having buyers contact multiple numbers of sellers in a given period and (ii) households having a preference for consumption variety and consuming baskets of goods. This ensures that there will always be a subset ofgoods among those contacted which the household 2 In the prototypical search model of money, exchange is characterized by one-for-one swaps of goods and money, implying fixed prices. Extensions of the Kiyotaki-Wright model with divisible goods but indivisible money to include pricing include Trejos and Wright (1993,1995) and Shi (1994) . Among the first to consider the implications of inflation in search-theoretic models of money is Li(1994 Li( ,1995 . However, because of these restrictions, inflation was modeled as a tax on money balances given fixed nominal prices. 2 finds desirable and hence keeps the steady state distribution ofcash/goods trivial. 3 Search frictions and market incompleteness are captured by limitations in the number of sellers that buyers can contact in a given period and hence limited consumption variety. An analogy of this process is a consumer who shops in a marketplace and encounters many different products but not all desired products in the economy. The model is closed by specifying prices set by monopolistically competitive firms selling differentiated products and a circular flow ofincome between households and firms. Laing, Li, and Wang (1996) demonstrates that, given the double coincidence problem, monetary exchange improves trading opportunities relative to barter by increasing consumption variety.
Since the emphasis ofthis study is on inflation and monetary rather than barter exchange, the model simplifies and extends Laing, Li, and Wang (1997) to focus on a pure currency search economy. In our basic set-up there is a competitive labor market and a product market with random matching. Households allocate their time over work effort, shopping time, and leisure. They supply labor to firms and receive a cash wage payment. They then proceed to the goods market and are randomly matched with a subset of monopolistically competitive firms that set prices. It is the choice of shopping time which endogenizes the matching technology and influences the extent of trade frictions. Once cash is exchanged for desired goods, consumption occurs and firms use receipts to finance wage payments.
The main (technical) difficulty behind direct extensions ofthe Kiyotaki-Wright framework to include prices and divisible inventories is that it leads to an endogenous distribution of cash and goods which must be determinedjointly with prices. Recent work attempting to characterize pricing behavior and the distribution ofcash include Green and Zhou (1995) , Corbae and Camera (1996) , Zhou (1996) , and Molico (1996) . Shi (1997) circumvents the distributional issues with a structure where large households consist of a continuum of traders. This framework is then used to study the effects oftrade frictions, money growth and steady inflation on exchange activity, labor allocation, and production decisions. With a given time allocated to shopping, an exogenous reduction in tradefrictions increases labor supply, overall work effort, and economic activity. On the other hand, money growth creates an inflation tax which a reallocation away from work effort to leisure. Similar to conventional models, inflation discourages market activity and real output.
However, by allowing shopping time and the matching technology to vary in response to the money growth rate, the results can be very different. In particular, not only can money growth and steady inflation encourage both work effort and shopping effort, but there also exists the possibility of multiple steady states. Intuitively, a greater matching rate encourages work effort and the higher labor income generated from work effort encourages shopping time. It is precisely this positive feedback between work and shopping efforts which why inflation can encourage market activity and the possibility of multiple equilibria. 4
We then consider several variants of the basic model. First, the introduction ofproductive capital allows us to characterize equilibrium capital accumulation. We find that a positive relationship between inflation and capital can exist in equilibria where inflation positively affects work and shopping effort. Second, we analyze how search frictions and inflation distort relative prices in a model where households engage in the "home production" of a perfectly competitive homogenous good. Finally, we consider an alternative way of endogenizing the matching technologỹ It should also be noted that our notion of "shopping time" is very different from shopping time models of money. In these models money is valued because it directly increases the value of leisure. However, while possessing fiat currency in a world where it is generally accepted reduces exchange costs, it is not immediate why the quantity of money itself saves on these costs. Our model captures the notion that shopping time is a costly activity required for exchange. 4 by introducing firm entry. We find that not only that can money growth encourage firm participation, but if a preference for variety is sufficiently large, this entry effect may dominate the inflation tax effect, leading to a positive optimal rate of inflation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II will outline the basic model and characterize equilibrium conditions. Section ifi then analyzes the steady state of the model with both a fixed matching rate and endogenous shopping time. Section 1Y looks at extensions to the basic model to include productive capital, relative prices, and firm entry. Finally, Section V will conclude with a summary.
II. A Multiple Matching Model of Money

Goods, Preferences, and Production
Time is discrete and the economy is populated by a continuum ofinfinitely lived households (indexed by h E H) and firms, with each of their masses normalized to unity. There is a large number of differentiated commodities of mass one, indexed by ü E Q. Each firm can only produce a particular good using labor as the sole input so that firms can also be indexed by~. A household of type h desires a variety of goods over a subset Q(h) c Q. The commodity space is ordered in so that a worker of type h, employed by a particular firm, produces a good outside of his/her preference domain, Q(h), so that there is no double coincidence of wants between them. 5 In this way, we rulẽ This model can support the possibility of a double coincidence of wants and barter between households and firms by specifying carefully households' and owners' preferences over a random subset of goods. Laing, Li and Wang (1997) does precisely this, proves the existence of both barter and pure monetary equilibria, and shows that under some conditions, the pure monetary equilibrium is welfare-enhancing compared to barter. Since the present study focuses strictly on the pure monetary equilibrium, the detailed structure to support fiat currency will not be elaborated. 5 out the uninteresting case of autarky as well as any possible matches/exchanges between a worker and his/her employer. We also adopt the Diamond-Yellen (1990) convention in that associated with each firm~is an infinitely lived owner who desires good~and acts as the residual claimant of the firm's output. 6 All exchanges occur between households and firms as only workers/shoppers are mobile. Both goods and money are perfectly divisible and agents can store money and their own production goods in any amount without cost.
We make the following assumptions regarding household and firm owner preferences and the production technology.
Assumption 1: (Household Preferences) . The lifetime utility for household h E H is given by, where êis ownership consumption of his own production good.
Assumption 3: (Production Technology) . The production technology of firm~is given by
where l(~)is the employment (density) and fsatisfiesf'> 0,f"< 0,f(0) =0 and the Inada conditions,
Labor and Product Markets
At the beginning of each period households allocate their time to either work effort, i~, shopping time (or "effort"), s~and leisure, L= 1 -4 -5 r Household's possess the ability to produce many types of goods but can only be productive at a single firm per period. Firm~E~offers a competitive labor contract to households h e H which pays a nominal cash wage W~(w) in exchange for the household's labor services 4.8 With this, the firm produces output y (~) according to the production technology given by (3).
For large values of~y, varieties are closer substitutes. This type of preferences is standard in the monopolistic competition literature, e.g., Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) .
Once household h E H receive wages from the competitive labor market, they travel to the goods market in which they are randomly matched with a set of X~c~(h) firms with measure cc.
We make the following assumption regarding this matching technology: 
The Money Supply Process
Lump-sum transfers ofcash from the monetary authority occur to both households and firms after the labor market closes but before the goods market opens. Thus, firms must finance wage payments with cash receipts accumulated from the previous period's sales.'°Let Xdenote this cash transfer, where a portion T, = OX, is given to households and i~= (1-O)X, is given to firms, with 0 Technically, the set of firms contacted by households contain a countable number of firms. However, given a sufficiently dense product space, we approximate the consumer's aggregation over his desirable commodities as a continuum as defined in (1). An immediate consequence of this approximation is that the pricing behavior of firms will involve pure substitution effects and eliminate wealth effects.
This timing ofevents should not be thought of as a cash-in-advance constraint on firms. It is the ex-post outcome of the richer environment where firms have the option of accumulating goods for the payment of wages. 
Optimization and Equilibrium
In each period, each household of type h is matched with a set of x products with measure a in their desirable consumption set~(h). Included in this set are firms setting a common monetary price P and a set of positive measure of deviating firms (denoted by Q'), with the representative deviating firm (indexed by o') setting a monetary price of P'.
The representative household's problem is given by choosing {c,(~),c,(~'),1,,s~,M~÷, } to maximize (1), subject to (h) and M,÷,is the beginning-qf-period household money holdings. With~denoting the multiplier associated with (6) the first-order conditions, evaluated at the limiting case where the measure of~' vanishes, are given by~=
"The liquidity effect literature [Lucas(1990) , Fuerst(1992) ] motivates a special case of this cash transfer process where 0-~0 and firms use the additional transfers to finance their wage bill.
Equations (1) and (2) imply a relationship between c(~)and c(~')given by
Substituting this into (6) yields the household's consumption demands:
Wi+T Wi+T
Equation (11) implies each consumer's demand, c(~'), decreases with its price P' and at a rate that depends upon the elasticity of substitution y. An increase in total cash receipts, given by W~i, + raises the demand for all goods proportionately. The consumer's preference for variety implies that the share oftheir income apportioned to each good declines with the number of trading partners a contacted.
Noting that as the set of deviating firms are arbitrarily small, aD/8s= y/(y-1)a'~'~a'(s,) c.
Using this, (6), (8), and (9), the efficiency conditions for work effort and shopping time are (13) Equation (12) simply equates the marginal disutility of work effort with the marginal utility of consumption that can be supported by the additional wage income. Equation (13) says that while work effort raises the overall level ofconsumption by the additional real wage, the marginal benefits ofshopping time is the additional variety which can be purchased with a given level of income. The latter is strictly increasing in the preference for variety (i.e. decreasing in y).
Finally, from (10) note that a necessary condition for M,÷, > 0 is given by~= or
Inequality (14) is the firm's resource constraint, and says that output is either consumed or else sold to other households. Inequality (15) is the firm's flow budget constraint requiring that total cash balances at the beginning of next period cannot exceed the sum of current period money balances, receipts from sales, and the monetary transfer less cash wage payments. Finally, (16) is due to the absence ofcapital markets, and indicates that the firm cannot hire more labor than is warranted by its current cash balances.
It will be convenient to characterize a stationary equilibrium by scaling all nominal variables by the beginning-of-period money stock. With ,h 1 I~M~s, w, = W,/M~S,and p, = P~/M~, we can write (15) and (16) as
and express the firm's value function as
With (15') and (16') strictly binding, the first order conditions, given in the Appendix, yields a Nash equilibrium in the price-setting game where~l
Intuitively, the monopolistic markup ofprice over next period wages depends negatively on 'y and next period's marginal productivity. Since firms must finance wage payments with cash receipts carried over from last period, the marginal cost of hiring labor, and hence the markup, is increasing with the inflation rate p. As p -~13-1 and y -~co, the inverse markup approaches the marginal productivity oflabor.
The firm chooses an optimal sequence {p, ', ê,, l,} solving (14) , (16'), and (17) given prices and wages (p,, wj. Labor and money market clearing implies that l,chosen by firms and households are identical and that th 1 = '~= 1. We now characterize the steady state of the economy's equilibrium.
Definition 1: A symmetric steady-state monetary equilibrium is given by quantities {c*,(c*)',l*,s* and prices {p*, (p*)',w*} satisfying~y
y-l pf/(l*)
where p"~= (p*)', c* = (c*)', w~= 1/1*, L* = I -i~-s"~, and from (18), (19), and (2),
Notice that a convenient way of expressing condition (20) is by substituting in (18), (19) and (22) and writing it in terms of the ratio of the elasticity of substitution of leisure to composite
where I'~L'~D and~= ULL,~= DDD.
III. Trade Frictions, Inflation, and Real Activity
This section analyzes the existence of steady state equilibria and investigates the model's steady state implications for money growth, inflation, and real activity. First, we will consider equilibriawith a fixed shopping effort and matching rate. Then we consider the general model which allows shopping effort to vary optimally.
For convenience, and to make our analysis more concrete, we will adopt some specific functional forms for preferences and technology. In particular, let f(l) (23) is given by
quilibria with a Fixed Matching Technology
Consider the case where the matching rate is fixed at a = a 0 so that s= 0. Proof: From (24) a sufficient condition for this is that (l/D~) is strictly increasing in 1. Substituting in (22) gives
Thus, 8(l/D~)/al> 0 and there exists a unique 1* satisfying (24). With this, (22), gives D* and (18) and (19) 
Consider now the impact of an exogenous increase in the matching rate a 0 and money growth rate p: Intuitively, an increase in the matching rate increases the marginal benefit of wage income, as it is able to purchase more consumption variety. This shifts labor supply out and lowers the equilibrium real wage. The resultant increase in equilibrium work effort and matching rate increases real incomes and composite consumption. Proof: From (25) it is immediate that a higher money growth rate increases the left hand side while reducing the right hand side. As the right hand side of (25) is strictly decreasing in 1, it must be that ai*/ap <0. Since D is increasing in i from (22) These results are not too surprising. Money growth creates an inflation tax effect which, for a given matching rate, decreases both labor demand and supply and equilibrium work effort. Real money balances used to finance labor declines and lower real incomes reduces composite consumption. This negative wealth effect of inflation is consistent with many standard general equilibrium models which predict a negative relationship between inflation and market activity.
However, as we shall see below, the ability of traders in the economy to affect the "frequency" of exchange opportunities and the extent ofsearch frictions can drastically change the characterization of steady state equilibria and even the impact of inflation on real activity.
Equilibria with Endogenous Shopping Effort
We now return to the general model outlined in Section II, where a = a(s) = a 0 + a,s. For a given shopping time allocation s, equation (24) corresponds to an efficiency condition for optimal work effort. Substituting (22) into (24) gives the LL locus:
For a given work effort allocation 1, equation (21) corresponds to an efficiency condition for optimal shopping effort. Substituting (19) into (21) gives the SS locus:
A steady state can be characterized by {i*,s* } satisfying (26) and (27). These conditions lead to the follow propositions:
Proposition 4. (Characterization ofLL and SS Loci)
(i) For p 0 sufficiently small, duds LL < 0, for p 1 sufficiently large duds ILL> 0, and there exists 0 < p < 1 such that dl/ds ILL> 0 for s < S < 1-1 and di/ds ILL < 0 for s < s < 1.
(ii)
The SS locus is strictly increasing in the (s,l) space: duds Iss > 0.
Proof: See Appendix
The LL locus denotes the optimal response of work effort to a change in shopping effort. For p sufficiently large, a greater substitutability between composite consumption and leisure implies that an exogenous increase in s raises the marginal benefits of work effort and causes a substitution towards composite consumption. For p sufficiently small, less substitutability between composite consumption and leisure implies that an exogenous increase in s will actually reduce incentives for work effort as households substitutes towards leisure. The SS locus denotes the optimal response of shopping effort to a change in work effort. An exogenous increase in work effort lowers the marginal benefit of labor supply and, at the optimum, this must be equated with the marginal benefits of shopping effort. Since consumption per type, c~,is strictly decreasing in s, an increase in shopping effort is necessary.
In light ofthese properties, we can divide the characterization ofequilibria into several cases and analyze the effects of search frictions and inflation for each.
Proposition 5. Given p sufficiently small, there exists a unique steady state equilibrium {l*,s*} such that as*/aa 0 <0, 8l"~/0a 0 >0,~3s~/~p >0, and au*/ap <0.
Proof: See Appendix.
Intuitively, a reduction in trade frictions, as captured by an increase in a 0 , generates a positive wealth effect which causes households to lower shopping effort and enjoy greater leisure and a substitution effect towards work effort. The SS locus shifts upwards in the (s,1) plane as shown in Figure 1 . Consequently, there is an increase in composite consumption and real balances, and real wages decline from the increase in labor supply.
An increase in the inflation rate induces household's to substitute away from work effort and towards shopping time. Figure 1 illustrates this unique steady state and shows that an increase in p shifts both the LL and SS loci downward. Note that in the case where p =0 and 0 =0, money is superneutral. However, the Cobb-Douglas specification is a "knife-edge" case where the elasticity of substitution ratio F is completely independent of the inflation tax effects. With p small, these results primarily stems from a wealth effect created by cash transfers to households. (ii)
For y-l> l/(1-4), as~/ap<0 and au*/ap <0,
For y-l < 1/(1-4), as*/ap >0, and for 1 <(y-l) < 1/(l-4), or 0 sufficiently small, al*/ap> 0.
Recall that with p sufficiently large, both the SS and LL locus are upward sloping. An increase in a 0 tends to reduce the optimal choice ofs for a given 1, shifting the SS locus upward in the (s,1) plane. This is the pure wealth effect of the improved matching technology. However, it also increases the optimal choice of i given s, shifting the LL locus upward. While both effects lead to a reduction in shopping time, the impact on work effort depends upon whether or not the substitution effect of a 0 outweighs the wealth effect. In the linear example where p = 1, these effects exactly cancel and there is no overall change in either the matching rate or equilibrium work effort (see Figure 2) .
To obtain some intuition for these results, consider the case where 0 = 0. A greater money growth rate lowers work effort for a given shopping effort, shifting the LL locus downward in the (s,l) plane. This is the negative wealth effect of the inflation tax. For y sufficiently large, the SS locus will be steeper LL and the decline in work effort lowers the marginal incentives to invest in shopping effort (see Figure 3 , Case II). Notice that from (22) However, for y sufficiently small the LL locus will be steeper than SS and the decline in work effort creates a substitution towards shopping effort. Consequently, the resulting increase in the matching rate increases the marginal benefits of wage income and the incentive to increase labor supply. It is precisely this positive feedback which can lead to an overall increase in work effort and employment (see Figure 3 , Case I (Figure 4 , Case I). Since a higher money growth rate shifts the entire LL locus downward, movement of equilibria along the SS locus implies 1* and smust move in the same direction and for 2n-1, n 2, steady states implies that n -1 of those equilibria will be characterize by al*/ap > 0 and 3s*/3p > 0. If SS is steeper than LL close to the origin, there is at least two steady states or, in general, an even number (Figure 4 , Case II). Again, a higher money growth rate shifts SS downward, implying that 1* and s"~must move together. Furthermore, for every equilibria where al*/ap <0 and as*/ap <0, there exists one where al*Iap >0 and as*/ap >0.
The possibility ofmultiple equilibria again arises from the positive feedback effects between the optimal choices ofwork effort and investment in exchange activity. It is this interaction between employment and shopping time which not only creates a channel by which inflation can lead to increased economic activity but can also generate a multiplicity of steady states.
As an illustration ofthe existence of multiple equilibria, consider y = 2,~= 0.4, p = 0.8,= 0.8, a 0 = 0, a, = 8, 13 = 0.99. Figure 6 plots the roots of (26) 
IV. Some Extensions and Appliations
This section considers several extensions to our multiple matching model which enables it to address some other important issues relating to inflation and real activity. First, we look at the relationship between inflation and the capital stock, second, we analyze relative price determination, and third, endogenous firm entry.
Inflation and the Capital Stock
One ofthe central issues in monetary economics, dating back to Mundell (1963) and Tobin (1965) , is how productive capital accumulation is related to inflation. Money-in-the-utility function models [Sidrauski (1967) and Brock (1975) ] tends to support a superneutrality result, cash-inadvance models with either endogenous labor [Cooley and Hansen (1989) ] or a finance constraint on capital goods {Stockman (1981)] predicts that inflation depresses the capital stock, and overlapping generations approaches [e.g., Drazen (1981) ] support the presence ofa "Mundel-Tobin" effect where inflation encourages capital investment.
We can incorporate productive capital quite easily into our matching framework by allowing firms to store unsold output which is then used in the following period's production process. With this, consider a standard Cobb-Douglas technology given byf(l,,k 1 ) =~where k, is the capital stock, 0<4 <1, and assume full capital depreciation. With this, the firm's value function can be expressed as
The firm's first order conditions, evaluated at steady state, will imply 22 =~w~(l +p)
Thus, a steady state equilibrium is given by {p 4 ,c 4 ,l*,s*,k*} solving (19), (20), (21), (28), and (29).
The modified versions of the SS and LL loci are given by (27) and
here J~~[13(1-4)}~'~"~. Since the steady state capital-labor ratio is constant, so is the marginal product oflabor, given by J. Thus, (30) and (27) solve exclusively for (l*,s* }, with the steady state capital stock k* determined by (29). Consequently, since the marginal product of capital is increasing in labor, any equilibrium increase in 1* will lead to an increase in k*.
The characterization of this LL locus in (30) remains largely unchanged from that given in
Proposition 4 for p bounded away from unity. Thus, we can conclude the following:
for p sufficiently small, there exists a unique steady state where as*/ap > 0, al*/ap <0, and ak*/ap <0.
(ii) for p sufficiently large, there exists a unique steady state where as*/ap > 0, al*/ap > 0, and 8k*/3p >0.
(iii) for 0 < p < 1, there exists the possibility of multiple equilibria. Among those where al*/ap >0, we have ak*/ap >0.
Result (i) is immediate in that at the limiting case of p = 0, s~and 1* will correspond to exactly Proposition 5. Thus, there will be a negative impact ofinflation on the capital stock. To see (ii) note that for p = 1, the constancy of the marginal product of labor implies that (30) will determine a unique s" while (27) pins down 1*. The reasoning behind (iii) is entirely analogous to the multiple equilibriadiscussion in the previous section. Thus, our model does contain equilibria where inflation can positively impact capital accumulation.
Relative Prices
The previous sections emphasized how money growth and inflation influences real activity through it's impact on household investment in exchange activity and hence search frictions. In this section we consider a different channel and analyze how the extent oftrading frictions and inflation influence relative prices.
In particular, we simplify and extend the model by exogenously fixing the matching rate, a = a 0 , and leisure and introduce a second sector specializing in the production of a homogenous good.
Households have preferences over both the composite consumption good, given by (2) and sold on the search market as before, and homogenous good Q. They possess a home production technology with which to produce and sell Q on a frictionless and competitive market at price Z~. Households allocate their unit of time between supplying labor to the market, I, and home production, h.
Assumption 4. (Preferences and Technology)
(i) Household lifetime utility is given by,
where D 1 is a composite consumption good given by (2) and Q, is a homogenous good.
(ii) The market production technology is given by (4) and each household's home-production technology is given by g(h), where g satisfies g~' > 0, g " < 0, g(0) = 0 and the Inada conditions, lim 10 g "(h) = o°and lim 1~, g '(h) = 0.
Household's thus choose {c,,c,', Q,, I,) to maximize (1) subject to
The firm's problem is identical to before and the market-clearing condition for the competitive good is Q~= g (l-l,) . This leads to the following steady state equilibrium conditions:
where z= (Z,/M~s)*and w*I* = 1. Equation (32) equates the marginal benefits of consuming from the matching market sector with that of consuming from the competitive home production market, and (33) states that the implicit real wage earned from home production is equated with it's marginal product.
Rearranging these conditions, we arrive at a single condition determining the steady state 1*,
where F '~L'~D and~L = ULL,~D = DDD, and a condition determining the relative price of home to matching market goods,
Notice that from (23), as the preference for variety diminishes and p -~13-l,this relative price converges to the competitive value of the ratio ofmarginal productivity across the home and market sectors. With this we make the following observations: 
Given FD < 0 and FL> 0, al*/3a 0 > 0 , a(z*/p*)/aa 0 <0, al~/aP<0 , a(z*/p*)/ap <0
Given FD =0 = F 1 , al*/3a 0 = 0 , 8(z*/p*)/8a 0 = 0; for 0 =0, a/*/ap =0, a(z*/p*)/ap <0, and for 0 > 0, l*/ap <0 , a(z*/p*)/ap <0.
Proof: See Appendix
Intuitively, case (i) indicates that as the severity of market frictions diminish, and a 0 rises, there is a shift in demand away from homogenous goods to differentiated products, reducing the relative price of the home production good. As a result, there is an increase in the allocation of work effort to the matching market sector, leading to a reduction in the real wage. An increase in the inflation rate directly lowers real income and the real wage earned in matching market production.
As a result, demand is shifted away from matching market to home production. While the increase in demand tends to increase the relative price ofhome-produced goods, the inflation tax effect on real wages in the market sector dominates and the relative price of matching market goods rises.
The Cobb-Douglas case (ii) is once again a knife-edge case where the elasticity ratio is independent ofconsumption levels. An increase in cc 0 leads to a greater matching rate and demand for matching market goods. However, this effect is exactly off-set by an equi-proportional decrease in demand for each consumption type. Also, if 0 = 0, money will be superneutral in affecting the equilibrium employment allocation, but the inflation tax still increases the relative price of matching market goods. For 0 >0, households receive cash transfers prior to shopping, and this creates an offsetting effect that reduces work effort in the matching market while still increasing the relative price of matching market goods.
Several empirical studies [e.g., Garber (1982) and Rogers and Wang (1993) ] offer evidence in support of our finding that inflation discourages market activity and increases the relative price of market goods.
Firm Entry, the Matching Technology, and Welfare
In this final extension, we consider an alternative method to endogenize the transactions technology. Previously, we have always normalized the measure offirms to be unity; this section considers the issue of optimal firm entry and how suchdecisions are influenced by the money growth rate. To isolate this effect, we simplify the model with an inelastic labor supply and shopping effort and set 0 = 0. Letting N denote the measure of firms, it will be convenient to denote R(N) as the ratio of the mass offirms contacted by each household to the total measure offirms, R(N)+ ct(N)/N.
Assumption 5: (Matching Technology)
The ratio of matches to the measure of firms, R(N), satisfies R'(N) 0 and R(0) =0.
We impose a fixed per-period firm entry cost ofK >0 and allow the measure offirms to vary subject to an ex-post zero profit condition given by ê(~')= KOf
Since both households and firms take this matching technology as given, theiroptimization problems will be identical to before, with shopping time and leisure normalized to zero. 
NI Nf(l/1V)l+p y roposition 9. The measure of firms and hence product variety is strictly increasing in the money growth rate ji, i.e., dN/dp >0.
Proof: See Appendix
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is straightforward. An increase in the inflation rate increases the monopolistic markup and, for a given N, firm profits and owner consumption. This encourages the entry of new firms and product variety. Of course, this may be an oversimplified result as generalizing to allow households a work effort choice may put a limit on the this entry effect of inflation.
Given the absence of leisure and zero profits on the part offirms, it is quite straight forward to check whether or not this inflation effect on entry improves the matching technology sufficiently to improve steady state household and aggregate welfare. This involves computing the equilibrium effect on V= [l/(1_p)]D* and leads to the follow conclusion:
Proposition 10.
With endogenous entry, the optimum rate of money growth is determined as follows:
(i) Given R'(N) = 0, the unique optimal money growth rate which maximizes steady-state welfare is = 13 -1.
Given that R'(N) > 0 and NR'(N)IR(N) is non-increasing in N, there is a unique positive optimal money growth rate p 4 >0 for sufficiently low time-discounting and a sufficiently large curvature forthe preference over variety.
By Proposition 9, a higher rate of money growth encourages firm entry. Since both the number and fraction of products contacted is increasing in N, firm entry increases the density of the product space and reduces trading frictions. If the matching technology is linear, then the optimal inflation rate exactly corresponds to what can be interpreted as "Friedman's rule" of p 4 = 13 -1 and this is a unique interior optimum. If the matching technology is such that the fraction of firms located is increasing in the number ofentrants, the optimal inflation rate can indeed be positive.
Any inflation rate lower than this worsens search frictions and impedes consumption variety. As a result a positive inflation rate permits households to enjoy greater variety and, as long as the subjective discounting factor is not too small and product variety is sufficiently important, this effect can dominate the inflation tax effect on households discussed in the last section.
VI. Conclusion
This The basic model we analyze is a production variant of a multiple matching model of money where both optimal work and shopping effort are determined jointly. We find that a positive feedback between these two decisions not only creates a channel by which inflation positively influences productive market activity, but also generate the possibility of multiple steady state equilibria. This latter finding suggests that the lack of strong empirical evidence supporting a positive or negative impact of steady inflation in industrialized countries may be the result of an economy in transition across multiple equilibria. However, our steady state analysis cannot address the stability of these steady states and the transitional dynamic response to changes in the money growth rate. Given our results, this undertaking appears to be a fruitful avenue for future work.
We then considered several related issues. First, incorporating capital accumulation into the model preserves many ofthese features, with the additional result that a Mundel-Tobin effect, where steady state inflation and the capital stock are positively related, can exist in equilibria where inflation increases work and shopping effort. Second, in our home production model, we find that the extent of search frictions can influence relative prices and that inflation can increase and distort and the relative price ofgoods across markets with varying degrees of trading frictions. Third, we endogenizing the matching technology with the optimal entry of firms. In this example, inflation, which raises the monopolistic mark-up, encourages firm entry and product variety. The resultant reduction of search frictions can lead to a positive optimal rate of inflation.
The results of this paper also complementary to some earlier work by Li (1994 Li ( ,1995 evaluating the consequences of inflation in search-theoretic models of money, In a fixed price 30 indivisible search model of money, these papers concluded that a tax on money balances can indeed positively influence search activity, stimulate the accumulation of inventories, and increase welfare.
Our paper suggests that these conclusions may not have been just an artifact of the indivisible nature of fiat money and inventory restrictions assumed by these models and are robust to generalizations to the search environment.
Finally, this paper has demonstrated that it is possible to construct search theoretic models of money which can be applied to a wide variety of issues in monetary economics. 
APPENDIX
Firm's First Order Conditions
Letting~.bethe multiplier associated with (16') and assuming the constraints are strictly binding, the firm's first order conditions for I, and p,' can be written as:
and where, from (11), ac,'/ap,' = -yc,'/p,'. The envelope condition is given by
Proofs to Propositions
Proposition 4 (i) Without loss of generality, let a 0 =0. Notice that the left hand side of (26) is independent of 1 and s. The right hand side of (26) can be written as
hus, the right had is strictly decreasing in I [d(RHS~)/dk0].Differentiating this expression with respect to s gives (ii) From (27), a sufficient condition for dl/dsl~5> 0 is given by a"(s) 0. This is certainly satisfied with our linear matching technology, which implies an increasing and linear SS locus, a
Consider the limiting case where p = 0, the Cobb-Douglas case. Equations (26) and (27) 
El and (27) is given by (A3). Since the right hand side of (AS) is strictly increasing in s and decreasing in 1, both the SS and LL locus are upward sloping in the (s,l) plane. By substituting (A3) into (AS) we can verify a unique steady state given by (ii) Given F= 0 = FL, it is clear that a 0 will not have any overall effects. For 0 = 0, changes in p will have no effects on I while, from (37), a(z*/p*)/ap <0. For 0 > 0, an increase in p raises the left hand side of (36), leading to l*/ap <0 and a(z*/p*)/ap <0. a
Proposition 9
With our functional form for the production technology, equation (37) R dp
Equating to zero, substituting in dN/dp from (A9) and simplifying this expression yields the optimality condition
Suppose a(N) = a 0 which is independent ofN. Since the left-hand side of (AlO) is strictly decreasing in p there exists a unique optimal p which satisfies this condition. Substituting (A8) into (A10) gives 
